As the CCS debate in Germany is rather new, only few scholars have studied the (lack of) public acceptance of this particular technology, whereas most of the existing studies mainly focused on the general perception of risks or potentials of the technology, while possible factors on opinion-making such as trust in experts, project initiators or political actors or communication strategies were mostly left out of the questioning of participants and the discussion of findings (Pietzner & Schumann, 2012) . One exception here is the paper Widerstand gegen Infrastrukturprojekte besser verstehen (2013) by Alexander Perez-Carmona. Investigating how motives of resistance against infrastructural projects and technical innovations can be understood more thoroughly from a social science perspective, Perez-Carmona names personal interest, risk aversion, (lack of) trust and finally (in)justice as the dominant motives of resistance and even though it mainly focuses on the German "Energiewende" and not on CCS in particular, his work and suggested categories have still built a useful foundation for the analysis of the CCS debate in this present thesis. As socio-scientific research on acceptance of technologies has shown, it is not primarily objective scientific knowledge that influences people's attitudes but also the subjective perception of the individual (e.g. Renn & Rohrmann, 2000) . In regard to concrete situations, voluntariness, controllability, fair distribution of risks and rewards and trust in the risk management are the deciding influences on an individual's perception and acceptance of technologies (Baker, 1990) . Studying the full range of motives for nonacceptance is therefore crucial to understanding and gaining acceptance. By considering both the public's general perception of the risks and potentials of CCS (as a starting point) and the other factors that have influenced their opinion-making (for an in-depth analysis), using the motives proposed by Perez-Carmona as a guideline, the present work combines the focus points of the different studies published so far on public acceptance of CCS in Germany and provides a detailed study on the controversy about CCS in Germany and the role of public (non-)acceptance in this particular case. Within this rather comprehensive debate, the Vattenfall CCS demonstration project in Brandenburg served as a case study.
It provided the opportunity to study a project that was not successful in the end because of a lack of public acceptance, especially in those areas that would have been directly affected by the project, which influenced and delayed the legislative procedure for a CCSlaw for Germany and left Vattenfall without a legal foundation for its demonstration and exploration project. What provoked this resistance by local citizens? Which circumstances and influences formed their opinion and what role did expert knowledge and scientific facts play in that respect? Finding answers to these questions is the main purpose of this paper.
Carbon capture and storage in Germany: the long way to a CCS-law In their coalition agreement, the German government, consisting of a federal coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), had explained its position regarding climate protection, energy and environment. Stating that nuclear energy as a bridging technology would be irreplaceable for a transitional period of time and that the extension of life time for German power plants, obviously under observance of strict safety standards, would be unavoidable, it pointed out that it would promptly implement the European CCS categorically rejected, stating that they were not willing to carry the burden of the testing alone, while everyone else shirked their responsibilities. "Brandenburg alone will not save the world climate" Prime Minister Matthias Platzeck contritely noted (Jung, 2011) .
In general, the cabinet under Platzeck had a positive attitude towards CCS, not least because they feared the loss of jobs at the Swedish energy company Vattenfall, the biggest employer in the region. The company planned a big CCS demonstration power plant in Jänschwalde, Brandenburg, into which they wanted to invest 1,5 Billion Euro, hoping for an additional 180 Million Euro of funding by the EU, after the CCS project was selected first out of six in the EEPR ranking (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011 But these arguments do not tell the whole story of why the local resistance in Brandenburg was that strong. Several other motives and factors that played a role for the non-acceptance will be presented and discussed in the following. Instead of being experienced as emotional, irrational protesters by authorities, they wanted to present well-founded arguments. Pointing out that they were by no means anti-science, he stressed that some of them, including himself as a veterinarian, even came from a "scientific background" themselves and that it was therefore even more important to them, that there was enough (scientific) knowledge about CCS before the actual demonstration of the technology would start (Schramm, 2010) . As local citizens, they saw their existence literally hanging on a "burning fuse", experiencing CCS as a threat to their homes, their lives, their future and the safety of their children and grandchildren growing up in the area (Fischer, 2010) . Because of this strong identification with the problem, as they assumed that CCS could be harmful to them or to future generations, it is then no surprise that the people affected were willing to continue protesting over a long period of time, not accepting any compromises, until their arguments would be taken seriously and recognized as an important factor in the dialogue, so that no one could be in the position to claim that he knew nothing about it afterwards (Schröder, 2010) .
However, even though the idea of personal interest and affectedness is clearly an important piece of the puzzle when it comes to identifying the motives for resistance, it would be too easy to reduce people's motives to pure self-interest and label them egoists because they are concerned about what is happening beneath their feet. Instead, a closer look should be taken at their relation to and their assessment of risk as another important influence on their perception of CCS.
Risk aversion
Most people today seem naturally risk-averse. Complex insurance systems exist for all kinds of imaginable accidents and potential risks which explains peoples resistance towards new technologies that are categorized and experienced as "risky" or dangerous.
Research conducted in the field of risk assessment and communication by Hance, Chess & Sandman (1988) regarding the discrepancy between the supposedly objective risk assessment by risk experts and the supposedly subjective risk assessment of lay people brought two main findings. The first was that citizens had a much more complex understanding of risk than the experts and also than the experts expected them to have.
They were not simply interested in the question whether the probability of death that is connected two technical solutions in case of an accident is smaller than that connected to everyday activities, as it was often suggested by experts. Instead, the citizens were interested in whether the risk was taken voluntarily or was something they were expected to cope with it, whether the risk could be controlled or was beyond their control or wether they were already familiar to the risk and whether the risks were natural or man-made.
CCS was experienced as especially risky by local citizens as it was an uncontrollable risk they would be exposed to by the authorities, without giving their consent, making them nothing more than Vattenfall's guinea pigs as Frank Steffen, mayor of Beeskow, termed it (Seidler, 2010) . Other than driving a car, where the risks could be accepted in view of the advantages (getting from one point to another quickly etc.), the risk of an untested technology like CCS that came with seemingly no advantages for the local citizens, could not be accepted by them on reasonable grounds. In their eyes, CCS was a technology which had no future and the demonstration project was pure "madness" as the people responsible would deliberately accept to endanger life and limb of the local population (Fischer, 2010) . Also, there was no chance of reducing the risk by being especially careful and if a leakage appeared, it would be out of the citizen's control. As the local population Baker, 1990) . A phenomenon that the citizens' initiatives in Brandenburg also seemed to have been aware of as they were actively informing themselves about CCS to present well founded arguments against the technology instead of shouting random slogans, to make clear that the reasons for their protest were not just "diffuse fears of hysterical people" but concrete questions, concerning possible geological risks and problems that had not yet been answered sufficiently by politics and economy (Schröder, 2010) .
However, that Vattenfall could not convince the opponents of the potential and necessity of their project had yet another reason besides a strong risk perception of the local population and that was trust or rather the lack of it in this particular case.
(Lack of) Trust
In a situation where the population had a strong risk perception (and aversion) and was therefore already rather critical of the CCS project, it was even more important for Vattenfall (as the project developer) and politicians (as decision makers), to make sure that their technical competence was not doubted and that they stayed trustworthy. For
Vattenfall, this was however easier said than done, as the company had a bad reputation from the beginning of the debate. "We don't expect anything from anyone anymore", is how the initiative in Neutrebbin summarizes the general feeling. "We gain our strength from self-confidence but also from the confrontation with the federal government and the energy company as well as the sympathies we get from the citizens" (Fischer, 2010) It is no wonder that in such a situation even the best public relations strategy proves to be rather fruitless. Better would be to bring independent organizations or individuals on board who are experts in the field and can give an unbiased, rational recommendation.
Yet even these (supposedly) independent actors could not help to convince the public this time. One of the reasons was that Vattenfall's was not the only reputation that had suffered. The experts and their expertise too had a difficult standing in the debate. Not having enough information to make an informed decision about whether or not CCS was a safe and promising technology, when everyone (politicians, the public and Vattenfall) was demanding clear facts on which to build their decisions, opinions or campaigns, is certainly not a comfortable situation to be in. As Reinhard Hüttl, member of the "Ethikkommision für eine sichere Energieversorgung" stated, experts themselves do not necessarily aim to use science to create certainty. Instead, Hüttl believes that it is the job of the scientist to constantly challenge knowledge. By that he can secure the existing and generate new knowledge. That is, at least for Hüttl, the driving idea behind science. Politicians and the public are asking for facts and certainty but in the CCS debate the situation is far from 
Feeling of injustice
Closely related to the motive of trust, yet a separate category is that of justice or rather injustice/unfairness. Being chosen as a potential exploration area, citizens asked the question: Why here, why us? Why should we "swallow the risk pill" (Schröder, 2010) ? What is important here in view of public acceptance are not so much geological and scientific facts (e.g. why the region would be suitable for testing) but that citizens felt that they and their protests were not taken seriously enough. When the government presented the planned bill that allowed federal states to prohibit CCS on their land under certain conditions (the so called "Länderklausel"), they strongly rejected it not only because they thought it would not be fair to them to carry the whole burden of the technology and to become the "CO2-Klo", the CO2 toilet, for Germany (Schröder, 2010) , but especially because they understood the "Länderklausel" as a reaction to heavy local protest in Schleswig-Holstein and as a sign that the protest in Schleswig Holstein was taken more seriously by the government than their protest in Brandenburg (Bund plant CCS-Gesetz im Miniaturformat, 2010). This (in their eyes) unfair treatment and the feeling that they were not taken seriously enough to be taken into account during the legislative procedure, making them feel like "secondclass citizens" only strengthened their resentment and made it even more difficult for authorities to earn their trust and acceptance.
The role of communication
While the four categories personal interest, risk aversion, trust and justice or rather the discussed motives of resistance that fall into these categories all illustrate aspects of the citizens' perception of the relationship between themselves and the CCS technology (which is then closely related to their attitude towards the CCS project), studying the role of communication, i.e. the way information was made available and how it was perceived, provides additional and crucial insight into why Vattenfall was not able to earn the acceptance of local citizens and had to cancel the project in 2011.
In times of television, internet, electronic newspapers and other media, people have an overwhelming amount of information at their disposal. This information is used on a daily basis to gain an understanding of the world, to form opinions and make decisions.
A selection of the total amount of information available is made, attention being paid to the information that is expected to be valuable (te Morse, 2009 Why? Perhaps because it is not so much the issue or information itself that matters but rather the way this information is presented to the people?
To gain understanding of a complex issue such as CCS, people need to be informed.
This involves providing them with factual, balanced information about the technology, its benefits as well as potential risks. In the best case scenario such information lets the established facts speak for themselves and gives people the opportunity to come to their own conclusions about the technology (ter Mors, p.4). However it was exactly this "balance" in information, that was doubted by the local citizens, criticizing Vattenfall for having a "deaf ear" when it came to the contra-CCS side and potential risks and uncertain consequences of the technology (Knaupp, 2010 Nevertheless, there is another factor that made it very difficult for Vattenfall and any other person or group in favor of the technology to provide the citizens with information that they considered valuable and that is the power of association. As mentioned earlier, we try to form an opinion about something by scanning our mind and memory for useful information or experiences that we have made. Being aware of this natural and often unconscious process, it can quite easily be manipulated by intentionally using specific terms and symbols that are believed to create certain associations in peoples'
minds. In the case of Vattenfall, these associations played a major role in view of the acceptance or rather non-acceptance of the public as it was crucial for the forming of the public opinion whether CCS was associated with nuclear waste or climate protection strategies (Renn, 2011) . Implying that they had learned from the debacle over nuclear waste disposal sites, the citizens' initiatives deliberately chose to take over the symbols of the anti-nuclear movement: Big wooden yellow X-crosses, standing for the "Day X", were Of course, these five main motives for resistance cannot be seen separately. The first four motives, personal interest, a general and particular risk aversion and (lack of) trust and the feeling of being unfairly treated, are closely connected. Regarding the overarching motives of risk aversion and mistrust it was mostly dealt with negative expectations for the future concerning health and financial well-being of the individual and his or her family. The difference then lies in the fact that regarding risk aversion, the main concern is the potentially negative consequence of a technical "solution" (CCS as a climate protection strategy), like the leakage of a CO2 underground storage site and the contamination of ground water. A lack of trust however is connected to the future behavior of particular people; it is about the expected behavior of those who are commissioned to give recommendations (experts) and make decisions (politicians) and those who are assigned to implement these decisions (Vattenfall). The feeling of being unfairly treated is, however, closely related to personal interests and to the questions: Why here, why now, why us?
Why is someone else's voice, someone else's concern, someone else's life and property taken more seriously?
Communication is at the same time a motive for the citizens to resist, as a tool for organizing effective resistance. As the communication strategy of Vattenfall (providing a huge amount and a wide range of information in all kinds of media formats) could not fulfill the purpose of informing the people and gave them the feeling of being persuaded by one-sided information (playing with terms and symbols to provoke influential associations). The last point has also shown that it is not so much the information itself that plays a role for acceptance or a lack of information, but the way it is translated and presented. This also applies to scientific knowledge and expertise and provides insights into the role expert knowledge and scientific facts play in the debate and for forming and justifying local resistance. While science and expertise were generally highly valued in view of making a founded argument by both opponents and supporters, the value that was assigned to the knowledge and facts depended on how and by whom it was used to make a claim. Both sides stated that they would use expert's reports and recommendations to form their opinion and legitimize their position and actions and especially the initiatives used it deliberately to be perceived as rational actors in the debate who could meet
Vattenfall at eye-level in the discussion. However, instead of being the main influence during the formation, legitimation and presentation of citizens' opinion and resistance to CCS (which would have been a reasonable assumption considering the scientification of western society) it seems that factors like a general and particular risk aversion, the bad reputation of Vattenfall and the problems of communication appeared to be a much stronger incentive for resistance.
Altogether, the case study of the Vattenfall project has confirmed what acceptance research has claimed: Acceptance research today, as a barometer of public opinion on the perceived speed and evaluation of technical change, has an important empirical service function for the social theoretical interpretation of modernity. Instead of being a means of manipulating the locals' opinion, it should be an opportunity to study public (non-)acceptance as part of a bigger picture, namely current and future environmental controversies. In that respect there are three aspects to consider.
First, conflicts provoke responses which provoke change. They can lead to real consensus, creative compromises and in the end a better way to approach a certain goal as was the case in the anti-nuclear movement, which resulted in a change of the energy system and the development and increased use of renewable energies. Whether this succeeds, whether the conflict leads to a change for the better depends primarily on people, groups and individuals and their competence to listen, to communicate, to mediate and only to a lesser extent on the plans or projects themselves. In the case of the CCS controversy in Brandenburg, public resistance led to the failure of Vattenfall's planned demonstration project. Whether this is good or not and if so for whom remains to be seen as well as the consequences the failure will have for the future of CCS in Germany and the further development and use of renewable energies.
Second, the role of science and scientific knowledge or rather the provision of this knowledge needs to change and it already does. It is not about expert's opinion against And last but not least, public participation (in whatever form) is mandatory for a democratic society. Including the citizen, the local farmer or artist, brings new understanding and insight from different perspectives into the decision-making process that goes beyond the "classical" expert knowledge. The crucial factor in this is how roles ("politician", "citizen", "expert") are defined and communicated and it is apparent that a great deal more must be done here, especially in the CCS debate.
